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ABSTRACT
A user study was designed to understand user security behavior
when processing phishing emails. Previous research suggests that
people are victimized by phishing emails due to a lack of
awareness and the adverse effects of time pressure and distraction
on information processing. We looked deeper to explore what
phishing indicators users overlook more often than others, and
whether applying interventions that emphasize such phishing tells
and awarding incentives for good performance improve accuracy
and influence task completion time. More specifically, 20
participants of mixed educational backgrounds were recruited to
perform an email sorting task. Participants were instructed to
move emails into a suspicious or legitimate folder. Phishing
emails varied by three different phishing tells: sender’s email
address, link or attachment payload, and message composition.
Each participant completed three rounds of the sorting task in one
session. In the second round, one phishing tell, with which the
participant struggled the most in the first round, was modified in a
way to make it easier to recognize. Moreover, one group of
participants was offered a financial reward if their classification
accuracy reached 80% or better. Participants’ performance data of
classification accuracy and task completion time were analyzed
and presented with a few interesting findings. This paper
discusses the complexity of conducting such a user study and
describes the research experience that the team had.

Categories and Subject Descriptors
Security and privacy: Human and societal aspects of security and
privacy: Usability in security and privacy
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1. INTRODUCTION
Phishing attacks are becoming more and more sophisticated over
time as adversaries are learning new techniques and strategies to
attack Internet and email users to steal sensitive information.
Hackers can conduct spear phishing attacks based on personalized
communication to improve the effectiveness of such tactics.
Defense mechanisms against phishing are not as effective and
those protecting against phishing attacks have less knowledge
about how users will behave in experiencing an attack, compared
to the attackers who are more attentive of user behaviors and rely
on the users’ tendency to fall for these attacks.
This project examined the current trends in email phishing attacks
and designed a simulated phishing study to better understand user
perception, efficiency, and decision-making. To answer the
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questions and test our stated hypotheses, the study collected
information on security related decisions by participants in an
incentive group and a control group. Both groups completed three
testing rounds: pre-intervention, intervention, and postintervention. Participants were required to perform an email
sorting task that included both phishing emails and non-phishing
(with spam email allowed) emails. Participants were instructed to
sort each email into one of two categories, suspicious or
legitimate, based on their perception of the security threat risk of
that email. Each phishing email had a specific phishing tell from
one of the three categories that we focused on to study: 1)
suspicious sender’s email address; 2) malicious email payload;
and 3) unprofessional/poor email composition.
We conducted the study in three rounds for each participant,
where in the second round we introduced support for one of the
three phishing tells that the participant had lowest accuracy score
in round 1. The intervention introduced modifies phishing tells to
make them appear more obvious, so that it should be easier for the
participant to identify the phishing tells and classify emails
accurately. Then, in the third round, the participant was tested
again on a different set of emails similar to those in the first
round. We aimed to understand if there was any training or
learning effect produced by the intervention in the second round.
We were also interested in user behaviors working under
introduced “pressure” in the form of a financial reward for a high
level of accuracy in all three rounds.
The performance data included the sorting accuracy and time
taken to make a decision for each email. In our study, we also
captured participant specific demographic and phishing related
information through a post-experiment questionnaire that gave us
insight into the participants’ background, such as computer habits
and general security awareness.
The user study captures users’ actions and, according to their
performance in handling different phishing tells, provides
customized support, and furthermore, introduces a financial
incentive based on task performance. Through this project, we
aimed to answer the questions and test the hypotheses as stated
below:
a. Of the three, which phishing tell is most likely to be overlooked
by users?
b. Is the average time spent on legitimate emails more than that on
phishing emails?
c. The average time taken by participants on emails with the
design intervention will be less than that spent on other emails.

d. Participants in the incentive group will take more time than
non-incentive group to sort emails.
e. As the time spent on each email increases, the participants’
sorting accuracy will also increase.
f. There will be an increase in sorting accuracy from round 1 to
round 2 due to the introduction of the design intervention in
round 2.
g. There will be an increase in sorting accuracy from round 1 to
round 3 due to a training effect produced by the design
intervention in round 2.
h. Participants in the incentive group will have a higher sorting
accuracy than those in the control group.

2. RELATED WORKS
2.1 Troublesome Phishing Emails
With spear phishing being the top attack vector and a common
attack type on financial institutions and payment services, email
has been the most common vehicle to conduct phishing attacks
[1]. Companies must be prepared, as attacks are becoming more
complicated and phishing emails are hard for users to distinguish
from legitimate emails. According to one study, 20% of company
staff ends up clicking on a phishing email during work [2]. Gmail
is the most popular webmail service used by attackers to launch
phishing emails to gain identity credentials and steal personal
information. Another study estimated that spear phishing is
responsible for 38% of cyber attacks on IT enterprises [3]. Banks
suffered financial losses of $2.5 million to $10 million per bank,
for a total of up to $1 billion. In a widespread attack on financial
institutions, attackers used spear phishing emails containing
weaponized .doc (Microsoft Word) and .cpl (Microsoft Control
Panel) files as attachments to execute a backdoor software tool
called Carbanak [4]. The growing number of incidents has led to
an increase in focused research efforts to gain insight about what
factors lead to phishing victimization and how design
interventions and incentives are needed to prevent this
exponentially increasing threat.

2.2 Phishing User Studies on PC
We have reviewed multiple reports on phishing studies and
interactive phishing experiments that research why people fall for
phishing and how to avoid it. As the number of emails a user must
read increases, the more likely he or she is to be deceived and a
user more likely attends to emails from senders that he or she feels
familiar with [5]. Therefore, users are more likely to trust and read
emails coming from popular financial institutions and commercial
websites. In our project, we were interested in crafting emails
based on this observation.
Phishing indicators are overlooked by a significant percentage of
users, as they often do not understand what they should check in
an email, and the inconsistent positioning on different web
browsers makes the task of identifying a phishing email difficult
[6]. The above study emphasized the importance of understanding
user behavior in a phishing attack to better defend against it. Our
design specifically focuses on several phishing indicators or tells,
their significance, and placement in the email to test if participants
can differentiate the various phishing tells. Habits form over time
as people routinely use email and social media and as soon as a
notification arrives, people with entrenched email/social media
habits tend to click it even before realizing that they are clicking
on it [7]. We collected such information in our study in a post
experiment questionnaire.

2.3 Phishing User Studies on Mobile Devices
While the motives of cyber-attacks range from theft to cyber
vandalism, activism, industrial and national espionage, almost all
the attacks use spear phishing as the vector to initially gain access
to an individual’s computer or mobile device to infiltrate networks
[8]. The use of mobile devices to access emails, bank accounts,
and online shop has exponentially increased. It is equally
important to study if the use of mobile devices influences
individuals falling to phishing attacks.
One study simulated phishing attacks that varied in the cues
available in the email [7]. It examined how the device used by
subjects to access it influenced the outcome of the attack. The
study results showed that there is not much significance of using
heuristics in processing emails on mobile devices. Our study is
currently limited to desktop computers, but we are looking into
testing user behaviors on mobile platforms in future work.

2.4 Phishing User Study with Intervention
We would gain more insights into user security behaviors when
interventions are introduced in phishing experiments. One study
[9] studied the effectiveness of warning messages, with two user
groups, one control group that received no warnings for phishing
attack, and another group that received warnings. Out of nine
participants, eight failed to act on warnings and fell to the
phishing attack. During post-task interviews, most of the
participants said they did not understand the meaning of the
warning displayed and tended to ignore it in part due to the
interface design. A second observation was that about half of the
participants indicated that they did not know the definition of
phishing.
There is a need to improve security awareness and training against
phishing attacks. Instead of flooding users with constant warnings
that could become intrusive and annoying, it is important to
understand the user's perspective and decision-making process as
an effective way of implementing security awareness programs, as
proposed by another study on phishing [10]. We aim to build a
user study that will test different phishing tells on user behavior as
well as the impact of interventions customized to individual users.
In our study, we introduced a design intervention in both the
incentive and non-incentive (control) groups (discussed below).
Each participant was given help with the phishing tell that he or
she struggled with the most in the first round by making that type
of phishing tell easier to recognize in the second round.

2.5 Effect of Incentives
We are not aware of phishing user studies that involve incentives.
As reported by a study of a statistical reasoning task,
performance-based incentives produced significantly better
performance than course credit and flat-fee rewards [11]. A strong
incentive can promote more objective analysis in situations where
there is an objectively correct answer. In our study, participants
must select one of the two choices and there is a definite
classification to every email. Introducing a performance-based
incentive factor would help us understand how participant
performance is affected. More specifically, in each round,
participants in the incentive group were given a monetary award
in addition to the base compensation they were guaranteed if they
performed better than the required accuracy threshold (80%).

2.6 Our Approach
Our user study is different from the related works in several
aspects of its design.

(1) Each participant has three rounds of the email sorting task, in
which we can introduce a customized intervention to help
participants in their weak areas and then test the retaining
effect of such “training” in the last round. We specifically
target one type of phishing tell for every participant to make
it easier for participants to recognize that tell in the second
round, and then remove the help in the third round to test if
the intervention in the second round had lasting effect on
performance improvement.
(2) Our study tests how monetary incentives impact participants’
security decision making and the time to complete such
tasks. There are two participant groups, the control group
that receives a flat-fee compensation and a treatment group
that receives performance-based compensation. We compare
accuracy and email sorting time of both experimental groups.
(3) Real time data collection and analysis is critical to the
individualized intervention scheme. We chose a web-mail
system in order to automatically capture and analyze the
performance data of each participant. Therefore, after the
round 1, there was minimal time needed to set up the
customized emails for round 2 to start.

3. USER STUDY DESIGN
Participants were tasked with accurately sorting emails by moving
them into folders, one for legitimate emails and the other for
suspicious.

3.1 Email Sorting Task
As previously mentioned, one important reason that victims fall
for phishing emails is because of the sender’s perceived
familiarity. It is likely a user clicks a request to reset password
seemingly from his or her bank. One key goal in a phishing study
is to make the phishing emails personal to the participant. We
chose a task design developed in a previous pilot study in the
summer of 2016, where the participant was asked to screen the
emails as the personal assistant for a professor. In this way, the
participant, without the full knowledge of the professor’s private
life, has to deal with uncertainty in judging whether the emails are
truly personal to the professor.
In each email sorting task, participants were presented 20 emails,
with a mix of phishing and legitimate emails. There were 15
phishing emails, five of each type of phishing tell. The five
legitimate emails could include spam emails. In the study, we
defined spam emails as unwanted (e.g., advertising, promotions,
etc.), but not malicious. The participant must move each email
into one of the two email folders. Note that the participant was not
allowed to click the link or check anything on Internet. He or she
had to base the classification on the email itself.
This study had two user groups with 10 participants in each. One
is the control group without any incentive (participants only
received the base amount of $20) and the other is the incentive
group, where each participant could be paid from $10 - $15. For
participants in the incentive group, if their classification accuracy
rate in every round is higher than 80%, a bonus of $5 is added to
the $10 base compensation.

3.2 Phishing Tells
There are three different types of phishing tells that were studied
in this project.
a. Phishing Tell 1: Suspicious sender’s email address
Phishing emails in this category have a suspicious email address.
For example, it can have a suspicious domain name, or misspelled

addresses of popular social networking and domain names (e.g.,
number ‘0’ in the place of letter ‘o’).
For the intervention for this type of phishing indicator, the email
address has more suspicious domain names and the email address
is always displayed.
b. Phishing Tell 2: Suspicious link/attachment
Phishing emails in this category have either a suspicious link or a
suspicious attachment. For example, it could have exe/pdf file
attachments or suspicious looking links, but with labels that do
not match the URL addresses.
For the intervention, the URL address is displayed and the
attachment is always an executable file type.
c. Phishing Tell 3: Suspicious email composition
Phishing emails in this category are suspicious in layout and
writing. For example, the logo, images, spelling, or grammar in
the email could be incorrect or improperly formatted.
For the intervention, such traits are more obvious or spelling and
grammar errors are shown in uppercase letters in the phishing
email.

3.3 Email Sorting Rounds
There were three total rounds, each consisting of 20 total emails,
five of which were legitimate and 15 phishing. The 15 phishing
emails were comprised of five emails for each of the previously
described phishing tells. Participants had 15 minutes for each
round to sort the emails and a two-minute break in between each
round. The accuracy for every phishing tell has a full score of
five, so in total 15 for phishing emails and five for legitimate
emails, thus making a total score of 20. After each round, a
python script processed data collected for the participant
automatically to calculate their scores. For the incentive group,
the overall score determined the reward to the participant.
In round 2, we challenged participants with a different set of 20
emails, again mixed with emails of the three types of phishing
tells and legitimate emails. The calculation of round 1
performance also determines the five emails of the type of
phishing tell for which the participant scored the lowest. If there is
a tie between scores of phishing tells, then we randomly choose a
phishing tell.
Round 3 was the same as round 1. It had 20 emails (15 phishing,
five legitimate) without any intervention, similar to those used in
the first round. We captured the performance data to check
whether the intervention resulted in a training effect.

3.4 Data Collection
We developed an experimentation infrastructure and data
collection methods that automatically recorded detailed actions
such as clicking, navigation, moving an email, etc. The data could
then be imported and processed for further analysis.
The system structure has three components as shown in Figure 1,
a RoundCube webmail server, a web based email client, and a
BurpSuite proxy listener sitting in between. When processing the
emails, the email client sends HTTP requests to the RoundCube
email server and the server responds with HTTP traffic. Both
requests and responses are relayed through the BurpSuite proxy
server that was set up before the experiment began. The proxy
listener intercepts communication between the email client and
server and captures all the data used in the analysis in its logs.

b. Is the average time spent on legitimate emails more than that
on phishing emails?
The average time spent on individual legitimate and phishing
emails was 23.97s and 27.61s respectively. We also noticed that
participants spent more time on legitimate emails in round 1 and
2, but in round 3, they spent more time on phishing emails.
c. The average time taken by participants on emails with
intervention is less than that spent on other emails.
Results show that in round 2, the average time that participants
spent on intervention emails and non-intervention phishing emails
is 22.14s and 23.20s respectively. However, there is no
statistically significant difference.
N

Minimum

Maximum

Mean

Std.Dev.

Avg_Time_Intervention

20

8.40

61.80

22.1400

13.39

Avg_Time_None_Intervention

20

12.78

39.95

23.2025

7.46

Figure 4. Average time spent on an email with intervention
versus an email without intervention
We need to look more closely at the times spent in round 1 and
round 2, for the type of phishing tell for which intervention was
provided.

R3_Normal_
Time

Incentive

Control

Mean Diff.

df

Sig. (2-tailed)

105.20

80.60

24.60

18

.024

Figure 7. Difference in average time spent on a legitimate
email in round 3 (incentive & control groups)
e. As the time spent on each email increases, the participants’
sorting accuracy will also increase.
The results are not significant. We did not find a correlation
between the time spent and the classification accuracy. We are
further looking into the data.
f. There will be an increase in sorting accuracy from round 1 to
round 3 due to a training effect produced by the design
intervention in round 2.
We found that the participants receiving help for phishing tell 3
improved their accuracy. In Figure 8, “R1_P3_Score” represents
the accuracy score for phishing tell 3 emails from round 1 to
round 2, for those participants who received help with phishing
tell 3. The p-value of 0.011 shows that a significant increase of
1.667 in accuracy for six participants. Recall that phishing tell 3 is
email layout and composition errors. Likely the intervention of
highlighting these issues in an email was noticeable.
Paired Samples T-Test

Paired Samples T-Test
R1_P1_TimeR2_P1_Time

Mean

Std.Dev.

t

df

Sig.

29.300

39.766

2.330

9

.045

R1_P3_ScoreR2_P3_Score

Mean

Std.Dev.

t

df

Sig.

-1.667

1.033

-3.953

5

.011

Figure 5. Difference in average time spent on a phishing tell 1
email from round 1 to round 2 (incentive group)

Figure 8. Difference in classification accuracy for phishing tell
3 intervention from round 1 to round 2 (incentive & control
groups)

For the incentive group, shown in Figure 5, the notation
“R1_P1_Time” represents the average time to process one
phishing tell 1 email in round 1. We found that the participants
who were given the intervention for phishing tell 1 in round 2, on
average, spent 29.3 seconds less time on one such email, with a pvalue of 0.045. However, this does not indicate their classification
accuracy changed in one way or the other.

Of the above cases, we further show the performance
improvement for those participants with an incentive in Figure 9.
The improvement is significant with an even higher accuracy
increase of 2.25 on average. This likely indicates that the
monetary incentive made participants more attentive to the
intervention received.
Paired Samples T-Test

Paired Samples T-Test
R1_P3_TimeR2_P3_Time

Mean
-34.60

Std.Dev.
28.563

t
-3.831

df
9

Sig.
.004

R1_P3_ScoreR2_P3_Score

Mean

Std.Dev.

t

df

Sig.

-2.250

.500

-9.000

3

.003

Figure 6. Difference in average time spent on a phishing tell 3
email from round 1 to round 2 (control group)

Figure 9. Difference in classification accuracy for phishing tell
3 intervention from round 1 to round 2 (incentive group)

An interesting result is shown in Figure 6. Participants with no
incentive spent on average 34.6 seconds more time on a phishing
tell 3 email from round 1 to round 2. Recall that the phishing tell 3
is that the logo, images, spelling, or grammar in the email could
be incorrect or improperly formatted. This could suggest that
these participants might become more attentive of such
information emphasized in round 2.

However, the interventions for the other two phishing tells did not
show a difference in classification accuracy. This highlights the
complexity behind providing effective interventions to users.

d. Participants in the incentive group will take more time than the
non-incentive group to sort emails.
As in Figure 7, the result shows that in round 3, the 10
participants from incentive group spent on average 24.60 seconds
more to sort legitimate emails with a p-value of 0.024. In other
word, the incentive group spends more time on legitimate emails
in round 3. We did not find other significant results.

g. There will be an increase in sorting accuracy from round 1 to
round 3 due to a training effect produced by the design
intervention in round 2.
Again, when combining all participant data, we did not find
significant differences in the classification accuracy from round 1
to round 3. This includes the performance for the phishing tell 3
emails, for which, with intervention, significant improvement was
seen from round 1 to round 2. This shows the challenge in
designing interventions that have a lasting effect.
Figure 10 shows a less significant result for phishing tell 2. Four
participants received the intervention for phishing tell 2. They
had, on average, a 0.75 higher accuracy score for the phishing tell
2 emails from round 1 to round 3, but with a p-value of 0.058, this

is not a statistically significant difference. More samples are
needed to better understand this potential difference.
Paired Samples T-Test
R1_P2_ScoreR3_P2_Score

Mean

Std.Dev.

t

df

Sig.

-.750

.500

-3.000

3

.058

Figure 10. Difference in classification accuracy for phishing
tell 3 intervention from round 1 to round 3 (incentive group)
h. Participants in the incentive group will have a higher sorting
accuracy than those in the control group.
Figure 11 shows that in round 3, those 10 participants from the
incentive group achieved, on average, a 1.3 higher accuracy score
for phishing tell type 1 emails with a p-value of 0.027. The
incentive group also performed better in sorting phishing tell type
1 emails in round 3.
R3_P1_
Score

Incentive

Control

Mean Diff.

df

Sig. (2-tailed)

3.50

2.20

1.30

18

.027

Figure 11. Difference in classification accuracy for phishing
tell 3 emails in round 3 (incentive & control groups)
When combining all participant data, we did not find significant
differences. However, the findings for hypothesis f suggest that an
appropriate incentive may result in better improvement in
coordination with a helpful intervention.

6. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
This paper presented a user study of phishing email recognition.
We evaluated how participants performed an email processing
task while varying the help according to their capability of
correctly classifying emails in multiple rounds. Moreover, we
offered monetary rewards based on the accuracy of their
performance to incentivize participants in a treatment group.
Preliminary data analysis has shown several interesting insights,
but, more importantly, demonstrated the complexity of user
security behaviors and the challenges when developing lasting and
meaningful design interventions. Specifically, we saw that
although there was performance improvement when certain types
of intervention were provided to the participant, that effect did not
carry over after the intervention was removed. On the other hand,
the use of monetary incentives may make participants more
attentive to benefit from an intervention, compared to the control
group. However, that did not always translate to a higher
classification accuracy.
We are continuing our research to consider more realistic
scenarios where users handle multiple tasks in a phishing email
recognition setting. This calls for further effort to carefully amend
the user study protocol and to fundamentally understand how
participants react to this environment.
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